Napoleon and principles of warfare
Une armée n'est rien que par la tête
Napoleon at St. Helena said, conscious of its exceptional quality, even after the defeat of Waterloo, he would talk in the future, whereas his opponents would have been forgotten. Again his intuition was correct: it seems to have been written about Napoleon Bonaparte more works than any other historical figure.
Napoleon had certainly mastered the theory of warfare since the days of the school of Brienne, which had entered his father and, above all, the military school of Paris, where, however, results in the studies were not brilliant: in fact, became lieutenant of artillery ranked among the last in his class.
However, this is not surprising when you consider that Napoleon was a province of a small noble overseas, Corsica, in the midst of the most famous scions of the great French nobility who teased him for his olive skin and a poor understanding of French. Even then it probably was not unrelated to the principle of the recommendation.
addition, we must not forget that Napoleon Bonaparte (that was his name until March 1796, when French wishes his name to Napoleon) not mastered the language French as his classmates and excelled in math but not in other subjects.
theory has codified the principles of the art of war, arguing that they are unchanging over time. In the history of modern masters in the field were, as we all know, Machiavelli and Clausewitz and textbooks of modern military schools are well-established fundamental principles that we all know, such as mass, speed, surprise.
Machiavelli was certainly designed by Napoleon and was also published in an edition of "The Prince" by Napoleon noted, the text would be found in the emperor's carriage return dall'infausta campaign in Russia. The records appear Napoleon Probably because basically compare the figure of the prince himself, but it is believed that the work is essentially spurious.
Clausewitz, however, wrote his work "On War" drawing on experiences and lessons learned and above all the strategy and the tactics of Napoleon.
Clausewitz's famous aphorism, "War is not merely a political act, but a true political instrument, a continuation of political activity, its continuation by other means" is an insightful observation of the story of Napoleon.
Bonaparte was mostly self-taught and was known to be a great player and a deep knowledge of the classics of history and strategy, by Livy to Julius Caesar and Machiavelli, to name only the most famous, and brought the lyrics with him during the campaign. Derived, however, its true culture in terms of strategy and tactics especially from the teachings of Marshall Maillebois, a leader of the French half of the eighteenth century that he studied and appreciated in a particular way.
Napoleon however was never a great theorist but a pragmatist. The memoirs dictated to Saint Helena can be seen as a codification of the principles of warfare that he had experienced and mastered. Not so: they are rather a brilliantly successful attempt to highlight for posterity his extraordinary not only talent but also work, determination and above all, ambition.
Napoleon Bonaparte during his campaigns and as a young general, both as First Consul and as Emperor, applied the principles of warfare in an intuitive and pragmatic, he argues, in fact, that no battle is equal to the next and that no battle is conducted and completed as was planned. Strategic and tactical plan
The estimate is undoubtedly necessary, but is even more necessary, he said, have the courage and the ability to adapt to the current conditions and the evolution of conflict ().
the popular imagination is, for example, fascinated by victory at Austerlitz in the campaign of 1805 against the Third Coalition (Britain, Austria and Russia) that ended precisely with that famous battle.
But that campaign was characterized not only by the outcome of the day of Austerlitz, but above all the determination and ability of the Emperor to move within one month from the Channel coast an army of 300,000 men, with whom he intended to invade England, across the whole of Europe to achieve victory over Vienna at Austerlitz in fact, concentrated in time and place best suited to defeat the coalition forces attacking ().
I think it is more interesting, rather than analyzed in the theoretical genius of Napoleon, know the most significant events. In other words clearer and learn more about the strategy and tactics for studying the evolution of the great leaders of the countryside rather than to memorize the Clausewitz. I chose to do this the initial stages of the two Italian campaigns of 1796 and 1800, where he was still very young (in 1796 was only 27 years old), was able to act with the practical genius that is the essence of his art of war .
no coincidence that I chose these two campaigns, though other subsequent war have a greater value in the collective imagination (I am referring to the battles of Austerlitz, Wagram or Jien, not to mention that some of 100 battles fought by Napoleon).
These military operations conducted in an area that we Italians know well but above all, more than in others, they can understand how Napoleon has brilliantly harmonized movement, mass, and surprise, and as policy needs, strategic needs and requirements tactics have been an inseparable whole in his mind.
The initial phase of the first Italian campaign ()
In 1796 during the war against the First Coalition (Britain, Austria, Piedmont) the Steering Committee considered that the main front was north of the Alps and regarded the operations of dell'Arma 'secondary Italy and intended only to make money in the rich Italy.
Bonaparte's offensive efforts and reversed the gravity of his brilliant victories were a demonstration of the goodness of its strategy. Contravvenne also the directives of the Executive intended to preserve the Piedmont of Savoy as he wanted to neutralize him and force a separate peace. Starting from Nice arrived almost at the gates of Vienna. His genius shone in the first part of the campaign, when he was still in front of the two Piedmontese and Austrian armies.
against two armies, one of 40,000 Austrian men under the command of Field Marshal Beaulieu and Piedmont of 42,000 men under the command of Field Marshal Hills, when they have 47,000 men in poor conditions, relying on discipline but also on the promise of honor and booty, was able to galvanize a disheartened troops, without money, without food and without shoes, to separate the two armies, forcing it to beat the Piedmont, just a month after the outbreak of hostilities, the armistice Cherasco and then proceed against the Austrians. It was certainly helped in this by the lack of cooperation between the foes who vied to win it.
In summary, the Austrians and Piedmontese made mistakes ruinous:
worked with divergent objectives (save and save Milan, Turin) and exclusively defensive
shook a pact not a single control;
disseminate forces (double of the French); not
Operations Coordinating mutual assistance;
did not exploit local successes, but that there were.
Bonaparte did you practice el'offensiva errors that led to the armistice Cherasco was a blitzkrieg, "avant la lettre."
The initial phase of the second campaign of Italy ()
Even in the second year stands out, even before the tactical, the great strategic insight. Bonaparte, First Consul, formed in a very short time an army of reserve at Dijon, crossed the Alps, where no one had imagined possible, circumvent the entire Austrian army stretched from Piedmont to Provence in the wake of the successes achieved in the previous year, realizing the surprise not only tactical but also strategic in the field. Then tapped the Austrian army under the command of Field Marshal von Melas at Marengo (June 14, 1800). Marengo
not, however, was the masterpiece of Bonaparte that he tried to pretend, indeed succeeding. He was so brilliant maneuver that led the French army in the Po valley behind the Austrians as the conduct of the battle of Marengo was shortsighted. Napoleon erred in assessing the intentions of the enemy and dispersed forces. The body of Desaix luckily only returned in time on the battlefield.
The Battle of Marengo did not allow the destruction of Carabinieri von Melas, left the contenders in the evening of 14 June on the same positions which were in the morning, weakened almost to the same extent in Austria and France. Bonaparte was defeated by just because the Commander in Chief of the Austrian could not find better than surrender voluntarily. Marengo did not put an end to the war that would end only in February the following year (Peace of Luneville), after the victory, this is crucial, General Moreau Hohenlinden in December 1800. The
felmaresciallo von Melas accumulated mistakes on mistakes:
lost the opportunity to occupy the Provence region in spring;
underestimated the Army reserve and not have it locked in the Alps;
disseminated Army in Piedmont and Lombardy;
agreed to take the fight instead of Mantua and Genoa;
divided his cavalry, which was a strength factor;
not carry out reconnaissance on the ground, despite having taken the initiative;
formed columns of attack "ad hoc" dismembering departments organic
poorly informed on the subordinate commanders plan operations;
not motivated departments on the eve of battle;
abandoned to the enemy on 13 days ago precisely the area of \u200b\u200bMarengo that the day after he was forced to retake a high price.
At Marengo Bonaparte also, however, was not immune from mistakes:
not identified at the time of the Austrian offensive intentions;
detached three divisions (Desaix and Lapoype) in unnecessary explorations;
dell'Arma not pursue the annihilation of Austria. Conclusions
Napoleon was undoubtedly a great tactic, but above all it was a great strategist. We celebrate his battles but he neglects the fact that those battles won by Napoleon came to very wide-ranging strategic conceptions, especially since (). In both campaigns in Italy were not only important but great individual battles and bold strategic plan that was the premise.
The events of the first and second campaign in Italy () between the principles that teach the art of war is to add "know take advantage of fortune "and is not a paradox. It has played an important role in these two campaigns, not only in this: in Marengo Desaix feel the roar of cannon and arrive on time while Grouschy Waterloo, sent out by Napoleon 's area of \u200b\u200bthe battle, hear the roar of the cannon, but not part, felt obliged to run the original order of the emperor. The results were obviously opposed.
emblematic in this respect, the operation Voltri the first campaign, commissioned by his predecessor, he has not shared but used to distract enemy forces by the director of gravitation effort ().
always adopts rapid change of sides and directions of attack in light of developments () (). He was able to share the intelligence with
departments in the area, keep them light to move more easily (), to survive and looting supplies and to confuse the enemy on the direction of the main effort and concentrate at the decisive moment to make the mass leveraging the speed of moving troops ().
"The Emperor is the war with our legs," said the "grognard" (). The French soldiers were mostly peasant conscripts, who moved only with the weapons, the ammunition and few supplies that were distributed, slept in the open fire when the camps were not holiday farm retreat where ().
This, unlike the Austrian soldiers who, like Napoleon on St. Helena he wrote, it was not clear how that had to fight so heavy.
had a privileged relationship with the soldiers in Lodi nicknamed him "the little corporal" and he called my children, even if they do not hesitate to sacrifice thousands, rather than the generals who held quite a distance, and visit the wards with frequency (as opposed to the Austrians) ().
One of his constant concern was the pursuit of surprise through the choice of alternative courses of action, anywhere maintaining the confidentiality of their intentions ().
He had the insight and pioneered the use of artillery to disperse rather than mass in direct support of individual departments (). Privilege also working in the mass of the cavalry reserve in arming the whole cavalry was commanded by Murat, while the Austrians, having cavalry far more efficient and equipped by the French, they could not use it to ground, which would changed the outcome of the battle ().
Napoleon can be considered the inventor of pluriarma complex units (divisions and corps) to be used as stand-alone pieces, while the Austrians considered the only regiment as organic units and not necessarily operating in combat could be divided to replenish other departments "ad hoc".
Regarding the organization of the General Staff, is' known to Berthier was the Chief of Staff for Excellence of Napoleon, a good table, not as master. It should be stated, however, states that Bonaparte used almost exclusively as more bodies in the preparation and dissemination of its verbal directives, rather than as a consultative body in the modern sense.
awareness of superiority or the urgency made him more often bypass the state and talk directly to subordinate commanders. Moreover, overlapped channel to reach the same order, due to the risk that couriers horse could be intercepted.
logistics and staff should not be an obstacle to the pursuit of the movements and operations: the Army Reserve who climbed over the Alps was completed and supplied gear for when he arrived and still south of the Alpine passes.
In summary, Bonaparte applied the basic principles of war in an intuitive way with courage and great flexibility, with players slow and methodical, which worked with concepts borrowed from their predecessors () (). Basically, no new principle but a particular application of the same pragmatic and realistic. Pursued their goals with great determination, never giving up, whatever the cost even in human lives.
Curiously and inexplicably, Napoleon promoted innovation in the means and materials: the gun was that of 1777 muzzle loading and laborious to be used (Mod Charleville), with an effective range of 100 meters, as well as artillery dating back to Gribeauval accomplishments.
I want to finish with another characteristic of the genius of Bonaparte, his ability to represent events in their own use and consumption, with a mastery of the art of communication that had already highlighted in the first year, changing the facts, time and loss , to use the fame of his troops but also its (). What he could not succeed in the field by the propaganda. The French guide
the Battle of Marengo (but I should say, because there are four reports, the latest being presented to Emperor Napoleon at Marengo on the anniversary of his victory) was gradually tamed, distorted and misrepresented from the outset and in subsequent years, four reports were written after the French, where we wanted to demonstrate that the battle was not due to chance but to a specific strategic decision of the First Consul. The aim was clear: it was a providential victory that allowed the First Consul to consolidate its power in France, but not ended the war against Austria.
In terms of myth Character is the symbolic representation of the passage of the First Consul the Great St. Bernard, the famous painting of Napoleon by David on a white horse. The reality is quite different: it passed by mule and run the risk of falling into a ravine.
