From "Prinzi G., M. Coltrinari, salvage . The crisis using armistizile 8 September 1943 for Italians time to decide, Rome, New Culture Edition, 2010 
maximum coltrinari
follows (aalcuni issues that are being debated on the sidelines of the National Council of the Association of Combatants of the Liberation War dela on 10 April (provisional date) in the seminar by the constitution organizzto Student Section and Material Culture of the aforementioned combination)
The collapse of a house of cards. Why the leaders saved the fascists fascism
The origin of the War of Liberation as remote cause, is due to the substantial failure of fascism as a movement as a scheme, which was failure to mature in the spring of 1943. In light of what happened then and that was one of the themes of the War of Liberation, which is the "betrayal" by the Italian Alliance with Germany, the return of fascism in the forms and activities that gave life to the Italian Social Republic, is interesting and necessary to understand why the fascists, who had all the levers of power and control throughout the state and not Mussolini defended their system in July 1943. It
acknowledge that fascism, in all its manifestations, in the spring and early summer of 1943 even more, had reached the lowest point in terms of consensus and confidence among the Italian people and the international consideration, and between enemies among the allies.
He had failed all his targets of war and the uninterrupted series of defeats, and has led to the loss of international prestige, he also fed the contempt dell'Alleato Germany and the smaller ones.
With the invasion of Sicily in the war had come home and it seemed nothing could stop such ruin. According to Roger
Zangrandi, "at the beginning of fascism was done for '43, as a result of three factors most related to.
The first (which it must be recognized as a determinant) was the military defeat: the discrediting of which completed the work already accomplished and corrosion from the war, noting that even many Italians, deluded or deceived, they had not understood before, the real essence of fascism.
The other factor that indicated the coming collapse of the regime was, in fact, made popular impatience and the opposition, now almost general, no longer hidden, and every day more pressing.
Finally, there was the fact, perhaps most significantly of all, that no longer existed, practically fascist. Even if the various groups of conspirators if they were not noticed and, indeed, measure their efforts towards a formidable resistance. In fact, except for items too compromised, and an occasional fanatic and a minority of young fighters in the atmosphere of excitement and disorientation caused by the war, could not open consciousness, there was, in the fascist camp, even among the highest hierarchy, he had no intention and will to defend the regime. The old regime had thus ceased to exist de facto in the spring of 1943, and those who removed the body, with some advance of the now postponed the funeral, but too late to make the operation useful to the Italian people, had no other merit than those that are usually recognize the gravediggers. Their action, on the other hand, was only inspired by considerations of personal convenience. The forces took over as the sole determinants stimoloquello had to find a way out of the disaster in which, together with fascism, s found involved " [1]
E 'in this climate of distrust towards fascism wide ranging look for causes and reasons that, after the proclamation of the armistice, will be the basis of the choices of the Italians who will implement the "fronts" of the War of Liberation.
All fascist leaders were aware that alone would not have had the strength to save the situation. It will just cause them to fall and the arrest of Mussolini. The occasion was the meeting of the Fascist Grand strongly recommended the put to a vote of the "Great Order of the Day", with which you entrust again to the King Vittorio Emanuele III all its prerogatives, and with what, in practice, and ousted Mussolini they decreed the end of the fascist regime. A serious step, which put an end to a twenty-year dictatorship of one party, step had motivations and complex reasons, but was determined, as a scatente the decision, the outcome of the meeting felt unhappy July 19, 1943 between Mussolini and Hitler. In this meeting the Germanic allies, with derogatory arrogance, had not given anything to Mussolini now helpless and exhausted. The Italian delegation had gone to Feltre in the hope that Mussolini, with his prestige and authority, was able to find a way to rip the ally Germany, a sort of consensus for a dignified exit from the war, these hopes were dashed, the Duce of Fascism had an attitude and submissive victim, failed even to mention the matter to a resolute and sure of Hitler and Mussolini came out with a clear defeat, laying the foundations of his actual dismissal.
The bombing of the port of San Lorenzo in Rome, July 19, 1943 in conjunction with the incontor Feltre by Allied, which infringed almost negligible anti-aircraft defenses, laid bare all the time even ell impotence Italy, and was seen as a prelude to more death and ruin, if he had not taken drastic decisions. Forty-five days
July 26, after a meeting with the King at Villa Savoy, Mussolini was arrested and the government entrusted to Marshal Badoglio. They hastened to proclaim that the war would go next to Germany, but few, including the Germans were driven to believe. In fact began by many contacts with the Allies to negotiate the exit of Italy from the war. In the days between July 27 to 30, the Allies were expecting a first move by the Badoglio Government, aimed at establish a first contact to start negotiations to reach at least to cease hostilities. This was widely, and even the Germans, surprised by the fall of Mussolini in a way cos' sudden, they were on the qui vive on the Italian affairs and they too were very clear that the next move would be an initiative of Rome, despite all manifestations of will in terms of "the war continues," Once out of the war. [2] Anglo-Americans and Germans, then, had made such an extent that they are ready to request the Italian out of the war, and had entrabi clear ideas on how to tackle this event. Those who did not have clear ideas and was very far from reality was the Badoglio government and its leader. We had faced the problem now that the situation required it to exit the war. The first step was made, or the removal of Mussolini, who wanted the war. Now we have to implement the way out, with as little damage as possible.
The assumptions were: a) with an immediate demand for surrender to the Anglo-American and contemporary complaint with the Alliance of Germany, b) gain qulahce week to engage in serious and dignified negotiations with the Anglo Americans, and at the same time engaging in serious and decisive negotiations with the Germans, being with them for a frank and DefInt explanation of the actual conditions of Italy are no longer able to conduct La Guera. In both cases, higher was the risk of coming to fight on two fronts, one opened with the Allies and the inside that would have opened by the Germans. One factor was decisive: it will take swift decisions, accurate and effective, not to give the opportunity for our opponents to prepare the counter-action to the Italian.
This was not implemented and percosero roads, trails, and also so that the end winding risucire discredited in the eyes of the Germans [3] , both in the eyes of Anglo-Americans.
In short retrace the stages of these negotiations, in which the protagonists on the one hand, the Italian, were the King Vittorio Emanale III, Badoglio, Ambrosio, Chief of Staff Acquarone General and Minister of the Royal House, and minor characters who for various reasons went into the story, the other the Anglo-Americans. These negotiations go through phases, briefly we can identify in a time when the Badoglio spervalutò situazone Italian, launching negotiations on an equal apara and dictating conditions also, a second phase in which I noted that the margins of discussion were almost zero and a third in which we accept all the conditions without realizing the immediate and real consequences. All this, while we continued to demonstrate professions of loyalty and camaraderie to the Germans in the hope that they suspected that he was secretly negotiating with the Allies.
missed an opportunity to act immediately and simultaneously scara without a valid reason the possibility of using envoys accredited to the Allies and prestige as Dino Grandi [4] and Marshal Caviglia, known anti-fascist, and highly respected for his past at military commands Allies. Scara was also the possibility of using the ambiascuate U.S. and UK at the Vatican because you did not have confidence in these embassies used diplomatic codes and were thought to have been penetrated by the Germans. While there were also other minor initiatives, which have lost nell'blio time. There was on-going initiative of industrialist Alberto Pirelli, who was sent to Switzerland early ia August, but its mission will not sort fact. It was said that Badoglio also tried the card of Freemasonry, for having authorized the issuance of passports comomodo, donating money and other, with the collaboration of the Minister of War and Sorice an active part of Badoglio's son, Mario, but also This channel up lost in the mists of subsequent events. There was also an attempt by the banker George Schiff-Gorgini [5] , but even that was lost in the moment. Then there was the contact established following the capture of an agent of the SIM by English in Benghazi, the British were willing to send in cipher and open this channel, but this opportunity was dropped. These attempts
we can define children helped with the passage of Girne to raise the threshold of suspicion by Allied, which every day became more cautious for fear of being cheated by the Italians.
you prefer, then use secnda diplomatic row, absolutely unknown in the eyes of the Allies, and essentially devoid of the charisma and international profile that the situation demanded. These diplomatic missions, as if the situation was normal, because these already compromised, Paet assumed to deal on equal terms with the Allies, with the intent to apply for aid to the Allies, convinced, totally unreal, who was in 'interest angloamericnao lead Italy in their field, and then shorten the war, that the Allies had to bring help to Italy, which was in serious difficulties with the Germans [6]
diplomatic missions undertaken were those el Counsellor Blasco D'Ajeta [7] and that of Console Alberto Berio.
D'Ajeta had to present the British ambassador in Lisbon, Sir Ronald Campbell, and submit to the intentions of the Italian government. A premise of these had to Figure 1) tempreggiaotre apparently the attitude of the monarchy and the Badoglio government was not to be misunderstood by the Allies, it was determined by German pressure, 2) that this pressure resulted in a massive military occupation Geerman [8] 3) that Rome was virtually threatened with employment, 4) that the conditions in Italy were disastrous.
D'Ajeta was then, in order to implement the disengagement, seek aiutoangloamericano, pending which the Allies had to suspend the bombing and to end the smear campaign against the government radio Badoglio and Italy in general. In practice, D'Ajetta should make it clear to Anglo American that the exit of Italy was in the common interest, which if implemented (as shown in Italian) would have greatly benefited London and Waschington. [9] The incontor took place in Lisbon, August 4, 1943, from 11.30 to 13, but the results were virtually nil.
Console Berio's attempt takes on the contours of the adventures of Western Switzerland. Berio [10] was the bearer of the following proposals: 1) the Germans were masters of Italy, eal first suspicion would take over in Rome, making prisoners King and Badoglio: 2) The Allies had to reduce if not stop the bombing, for facilitate keeping the home front 3) The Allies had an affectionate landing in southern France, the Balkans in order to draw German forces and relieve the pressure on Italy. All this to give the possibility with the Italian government to effetture disconnection, and exit successfully by the Germans during the war. During the conversations that Berio was also to ask the Allies to land as possible to the north of Rome, in order to further facilitate the Italian action.
These proposals were presented to the British consul added Watkinson (the owner was on holiday) August 5, 1943
Several attempts were made to negotiate an armistice, many unrealistic, others clumsy, partly suspicious Allies. Finally, in situations that unleashed a controversy will still not dormant, it came to signing on September 3, 1943 Cassibile the so-called "short armistice." On the basis of agreements and uncontrolled feelings the government in Rome believed that the proclamation of the armistice should be no earlier than September 12. In fact, the Allies did coincide with the landing at Salerno, scheduled for September 9, in the conviction that the rendering of the Italian troops would have facilitated the landing, as in fact happened. Proclaimed on 8 September at 18.30 and 19.45 from Algiers on Radio Rome with a message of Marshal Badoglio, the armistice pagie opened one of the most controversial and dark of our recent history. The reaction
not longer than 48 hours by the Italian armed forces, combined by the prompt and decisive action by German meant that all the Italian state apparatus collapsed at once. The King and the Government he moved, via Pescara, Brindisi, opening a grave constitutional crisis. The fact negligence on the part of the Sovereign and the Government was only left the capital and moved to another part of the territory of the State to secure the German threat; serious was the fact that for over 48 hours did not give orders to chicessia, leaving the more complete uncertainty commands and ministries and the entire state apparatus. Fail in these duties by the King and the Head of Government, at times delicate and difficult as those armistice, it is unacceptable and intolerable knew what the reason for this attitude?. Road hypotheses
Beyond any consideration for every Italian was time to decide. Prior to the soldiers who found themselves in front of the leveled weapons the Germans then for every Italian citizen was the beginning of the season, when compared with the absence of any national authority, it was impossible not to react and stand up, otherwise survival.
To the soldiers in the aftermath of the proclamation of the armistice the choices were as follows:
. in the presence or consent of precise orders, leaving the divided and try to reach their homes, escaping the German capture, in many they succeeded, others were captured and interned in Germany.
. resisting, fighting, any request for transfer of arms.
Those who found themselves in the South in territory controlled by the Allies, had the chance or to remain in their homes, or to become part of Allied Logistics Organization, or join the ranks of the Royal Army, which was being formed with great difficulty.
Those who are in the north in territory controlled by the Germans, were able to remain in their homes, but with greater difficulty as threatened by German raids, the raids, and by continued efforts to forced labor. Or enter the ranks of the partisan movement in both formations than in the mountain town, a choice that began to reveal at the end of 1943. Or for those who would be faithful to the old covenant, adhere to the Italian Social Republic entering the ranks of its civil and military organizations.
Both the north and south, there was a mass of Italians who tried to choose as long as possible trying to overcome the present situation, gave life to the 'wait and see "that you outlined a sure winner for sure and then make their own choices . The wait is over mafestazione low profile of the Liberation War, the result of the defeat and material needs that became every day more and more compelling, in the belief that they were the "others" who would bring and end the war.
for troops abroad, the situation was even more painful. We have various categories, among the soldiers, who worked several choices which were:
Those who escaped the capture of Germany, and hid themselves and in the remainder of their stay abroad or were always hidden or join the ranks of local resistance;
The "inmates" . or those who directly or indirectly fell into German hands and were interned in concentration camps in Germany or Poland.
The "fighters", or those who, without abandoning its weapons, reached the strength of the existing training room and began the fight against fascism.
The "lucky" those who managed to return to Italy (both released that one occupied by the Germans) taking advantage of convoys or ships sent by the regional government or organization with the consent of the Germans. These, with the passing months, those who joined, datas to the bush waiting for the events, organized through the Adriatic or to pass through the border with makeshift equipment or using resources of the Royal Navy sent specially.
The "faithful to the old covenant," that those who accepted the offers of the German past and also because of choices due to chance and circumstances, in their ranks in the name of the fascist ideas by following the motivations that led to the war at the time Axis. Among these there were also those who initially "Internal" to aderrono German proposals for social justice and to enter their military organizations.
If the Italians are called to choose how to engage and how to deal with this, it is clear that they are subordinate situation facing the Allies and Germans. They are, in essence, members of a defeated country, who can not camp at the time, no rights. They have completely lost sovereignty of their territory. This is in the hands of the South to the Anglo-Americans and their allies in the North of Germany. Sobo's occupants, who establish their own government which will be until the end of hostilities, to varying degrees, the absolute owners and managers of Italian sovereignty over the territory in an absolute sense
Any organization or Italian or Italian formation of any kind has been serving the North and the South of the occupants, regardless of any consideration. The last word in any matter, circumstance or another, but not for the Italians to Anglo-Americans to the Germans. Based on their benevolence or good will there be room for maneuver for the Italians for the realization of their desires and interests.
should always keep in mind, then, that in the War of Liberation in both North and South is the occupier whether Anglo-American or German who decides when and how of each action. There will be room for the Italians to affect this mechanism. It follows one of the corollaries of the War of Liberation: The Italian interests, whatever they are, are and will always be subordinated to those of the occupier. It will be only the benevolence of that if anything will be granted, but only in view, or by virtue of a clear benefit of the lender.
should take note of this and sgombare the field from all other considerations. E 'typical also transform some aspects of historiography in the above elements favorable to us. The partisan movement never had the strength to replace the Allied armies and its action always depended on the material support of the Allies. Alexander's proclamation of November 1944 was a real trauma for all the partisan movement, which was surpassed only by the force of morality and ethics of those who had choose to fight in the mountains. Claiming that "the partisans were" avincere the war means not or do not want conoscre riconoscre what really happened in those years of war. There are other "versions" that during these decades have gradually piled up, to justify this or that, but they are versions of convenience, to serve the needs of the moment and certain political forces that have nothing to do with reality of the War of Liberation. If
in terms of power relations on a purely material and the situation is as described, very different was that the moral and political. While it is true that many Italians fled in waiting if conservative forces as the Catholic Church, however, strongly compromised with Fascism, were an obstacle to any initiative designed to Italy to have a future different from past ones, it is true that the War of Liberation, there was tension because it operates on a moral and ethical unparalleled . It was hoped, through the commitment and overcoming dell'attendismo and interests of individuals, something different for future generations. They fought and were facing difficulties and risks in view of a better tomorrow that was not present. He suffered and endured the busy, and North and South, in the belief that everything would be over soon and that there was a possibility to choose a different model of social life from what had until then. It was the ideal thrust of the partisan movement in the North who gathered in its ranks men from the most disparate, often antagonistic to each other, as I showed the post-war stay in, but united in the fight against fascism, as the soldiers of the south, past the " Who is to do, fight and knew how to react to such defeatism, as the interiors in Germany, cn a simple signature would end all their suffering, but who resisted in the name of something that would be the connective tissue of ' Italy of tomorrow as those who fought for freedom abroad in other nations hoping to have it in their return to Italy and finally as those in prison and joined the struggle against fascism collaborated as co-always hoping that something would change for the future. And 'the assets of the War of Liberation, which subject the occupant on the material plane, bound to the interests of others, was scuila and ground of moral commitment and ethical investment for the future, a hope for a better future.
This approach to the Liberation War, may well understand how it has been the crucible of our recent history and that it be merged CompoNet all of our society, from the extreme right to the extreme left, which, thanks to the participation of all, has meant that Italy could go back brightness with the abyss in which it was sunk as a result of a war conducted poorly and lost even more badly.
[1] Zangradni R., 1943: July 25 to September 8, Milano, Feltrinelli Editore, 1964, p.. 40.
[2] Goebels wrote in his diary, the day after the armistice, "September 9, 1943. It is the fall of Mussolini abbiao Qusta always thought and expected move. We will not have to make substantial changes in our measures. We can put in the motorcycle Fuhr he wanted to do immediately after the fall of Mussolini. "
[3] Greening German reputation in the eyes of "traitors", bearing in mind the "waltz" of the First World War, when it joined the cartel after decades of militancy in the "Three", although the alliance was formally ended. The Germans they manifest this feeling of contempt with the insult "Badoghlio. Not least the Anglo-Americans in their vocabulary the insriranno Bereto "To Badoglio" as synonymous with deception, superficiality mixed with stupidity, deception and whatever else you can add ignominious in the relations between human beings.
[4] Department had been ambassador in London for eight years and boasted friendships money even in the most intimate circle of Cherchill, asked in a loud voice and persistently to be responsible for conducting negotiations, but in vain. It was late August when everything was compromised and its mission, the evidence of things, was never started, but serve 'at the same Department and his family to save themselves in Spain.
[5] These played a leading role in 1914 as he was able to complete the grant awarded by France to the "People of Italy", directed by Mussolini to take him permanently, given the substantial amount of money on the bank interventionist .
[6] It 's really difficult to understand this way of putting the question out of the war as Europe was under occupation since 1939 German. The Anglo-Americans were going to bring help to Italy and the Italians, who knows what in the name of or in exchange for who knows what, while nothing had been done and could do to Norwegian, Greek, Belgian, Czech, Danish, Poles, Russians, Yugoslavs, French, etc.. all under the German opment and without any guilt.
[7] D' Ajetta was a man tied to Acquarone, even for their friendship strengthened. D'Ajetta that was introduced in exclusive clubs, it is that D'Acquarone Ajetta attended and well-known for what he would once have been defined as "doce life," Galeazzo Ciano, which yielded in-law of Il Duce, as well as resentment and all 'hate Rachel's mother-in-law, the famous reputation of debauchery and amorality. It shows even more that the choice of our emissary to be sent to treat such a problem as the exit from the war, headed by the character of this kind, it was not really happy.
[8] D' Ajetta was able to give extensive information on this aspect; certment and accuses of "traitors" to the Italians advanced on the German side in this sector has substantial funds.
[9] In this proposal, the comment was Cherchill "From first to last word, D'Ajeta has not the slightest allusion to terms of peace and all his exposure was not that the prayer us apart from Italy by the Germans and of itself, and as soon as possible. "
[10] coverage was given the assumption of the post of Berio Italian Consul General in Tangier, left uncovered by Mario Badoglio . You had the support of any of the vice-consuls and groppello Castronovo as well as the good offices of consoerte Mario Badoglio, Giuliana. It had all the precautions necessary to contact the British Consul Gascoigne, and give him the Italian demands. Absolutely had to make sure that nothing leaked because Tangier was full of German spies. E 'hardly necessary to point out that just arrived in Tangier Berio, some local newspapers had published The news that an Italian plenipotentiary had arrived to make contact with the Allies and to treat the exit from the war.
