Sunday, January 2, 2011

What Is The Minimum Thickness Of The Plastic?



Report

The Privy Council on 8 September 1943, in memory of Major Luigi Marchesi
and motivations
of Marshal Pietro Badoglio and the King Vittorio Emanuele III 

Riccardo Scarpa

The Privy Council, convened by the King Vittorio Emanuele III, and bat at five pm 8 September 1943, in the hall of the palace of Don Quixote Quirinale, where it will be decided to give news of the armistice signed at Cassibile by General Giuseppe Castellano and General Walter Bedell Smith, and the events immediately preceding the meeting, influencing the outcome, and have followed, are essential pieces to reconstruct exactly a defining moment in the history of Italy. Events, however, described only by the testimony of those present, with all the limitations that the source poses. The more detailed description is certainly contained in the testimony of the then Major Luigi Marchesi, in service to the General Staff of the Royal Army, coming from Alpine. Son of a Colonel of the Royal Army, he entered the Royal Academy of Infantry and Cavalry in 1928. Lieutenant in 1931 and sent to 3 Alpini Regiment of the Western Alps, mountaineer and ski instructor, admitted to the War College at twenty-seven, in 1940 he was sent on a mission to the High Command of the Wehrmacht, for his knowledge of German, on the Maginot Line. Since the outbreak of war had been, for three years with General Vittorio Ambrosio, who had followed the office operations of the 2nd Army, the Chief of Staff of the Royal Army, the Supreme Command, and Cassibile, by General Giuseppe Castellano, during the final stage of negotiations for an armistice. The Marquis has published about these events, two memoirs: How did we get to Brindisi, which was released for the types of Bompiani in 1969, and: 1939-1945 - Dall'impreparazione unconditional surrender, published by Murcia in 1993. General Boscardi Henry, Director of the Center for Studies and Historical Research on the Liberation War, published in the present it Marchesi, June 17, 1993, in Palazzo Barberini, has highlighted some key elements, the object that we are concerned. Major Luigi Marchesi was returned to Rome on September 5, 1943, from Cassibile to report to the General Vittorio Ambrosio, and deliver, in addition to a letter of Gen. Giuseppe Castellano that accompanied the text of the armistice and the riders, a ticket of Gen. Bedell Smith PEL Marshal Pietro Badoglio and two reminder for the Joint Chiefs of Royal Navy and Royal Air Force and, for the SIM, the Order of Operations for the 82 nd Airborne Division of the United States of America, that is the plan of the famous GIANT TWO-operation, with which the U.S. would have to be Airborne Division in Rome, the day of publication of the armistice, in defense of the capital of the Kingdom of Italy by the Germanic forces. The following arrived in Rome on September 7th Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Col. William Tudor Gardiner to verify the feasibility of TWO GIANT. They were received by Col. Salvi and the Marquis himself. This ensures that Gen. Taylor airfields were, in all probability been prepared for the landing of the aircraft that were supposed to carry the 82 nd U.S. Airborne Division. In fact, their orders had been given to the General Staff of the Royal Air Force on day 5. So in January prompted a meeting with Giacomo Carboni, in his capacity as Commander of the Motorised Corps, from which it would depend on the U.S. 82 nd Airborne Division during Operation GIANT TWO, according to the agreements Cassibile. Gen. Maxwell Taylor, among others, reported Maj. Luigi Marchesi that "tomorrow night will be launched immediately after the paratroopers and planes started to land." He added that, again the next day, September 8, will, together, the day Operation Avalanche, which is the landing, and the day that Marshal Pietro Badoglio must disclose the armistice. This despite the Marquis had pointed out that the visitor does not Supreme Commander s'attendeva so before four or five days. However, as the said Taylor, the armistice of Cassibile not default the date. Gen. James Carboni occurred, they wanted to talk with Maxwell Taylor in January without saying Marchesi, at the end: "everything adjusted, now go by Badoglio. Gen. James Carboni, in January after a meeting with Maxwell Taylor and Col. William Tudor Gardiner and a second Talk to Italy Villa, residence of Marshal Pietro Badoglio led the latter to sign a telegram to General Dwight D. PEL Eisenhower asking to delay the proclamation of the armistice and cancel the transaction GIANT TWO: "data and change the situation precipitating the German forces there and the area of \u200b\u200bRome." Forces that would make, according to the Carboni, not the operation of the 82nd Airborne Division, as there were sufficient forces to secure the airports. Only after the response message of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower, giving notice to the fulfillment of commitments and threat, otherwise, to make known to the world the 'deal' is felt, Acquarone Minister, His Majesty the King, who immediately arrange a meeting of the Privy Council for five and a half hours in the afternoon, in the room of Don Quixote. There are the head of government Marshal Pietro Badoglio, the Chief of Staff General Vittorio Ambrosio, Minister of War General Anthony Sorice, Minister of the Royal Navy Admiral Raffaele De Courten, Minister of the Royal Air Force in January Renato Sandalli, the head of SIM, Gen. James Carboni, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Royal Army De Stefanis, representing Gen. Mario Roat, Chief of Staff of the Royal Army, engaged in a conversation with the January Westphall, the adjutant of MS Prop Paul King, and said Maj Luigi Marchesi. At that time Gen. James Carboni, who was sent home Gen. Maxwell Taylor and Col. William Tudor Gardiner after having canceled the operation because of TWO GIANT, violently attacking Gen. Giuseppe Castellano, his conduct of negotiations for the armistice, everything is silent on the transaction TWO GIANT, who had refused without warning anyone, and proposes to disavow Head of Government, Chief of General Staff, Lt. Gen. Giuseppe Castellano, and immediately find an agreement with the Germans, and reconfirm the Axis alliance and the desire to pursue the war on the side of the Third Empire, Nazi Germany. Maj. Marchesi, who had been called out room, covered to give you the news that Radio Algiers, at six-thirty in the afternoon, had issued the proclamation of the armistice with the Kingdom of Italy, both with the message of Gen. Dwight D. Eisenhower that with the English translation of the message of Marshal Pietro Badoglio. Gen. James Carboni, at this point, he spoke again arguing that this changed nothing in its proposal. It is, however, interrupted by Major Luigi Marchesi, which begins: "a precise statement of the agreements made with the Allied Command after the armistice was signed, I illustrated - he continues - the importance that we attach to the Anglo-American military cooperation . It alone, and to an extent its size, could remove the hardness of the armistice terms. " He went on: "The anticipation of the armistice by the allies was a painful surprise for us. Strictly speaking, however, the Allies were in terms of the agreements, because the hypothetical date of 12, indicated by General Castellano, (...) was the result of a deduction of the General himself (...) It was a mistake not to give credit to the statement of Taylor in January and, worse, deluded about the possibility of an extension. Talk about betrayal by Anglo American, as Gen. Carboni had just mentioned, it was absurd (...) Do not keep faith with the agreements reached and signed, would have been historically an indelible stain of shame for Italy. The signing of the armistice by the Italian delegate day 3 was photographed and filmed by journalists, photographers and onlookers. The text of the proclamation which was immediately, without further delay, be issued by Marshal Badoglio, was integral in the version in the hands of the Allies. True to form, delaying again, who gave themselves reading from their radio stations (such as, in fact, did). I said that if we had not kept its commitments, we could safely count on a huge response. Gen. Alexander told him that he had received in Cassibile, having learned that Gen. Castellano did not have the delegated to sign the armistice and how he had made us aware that, on the fields of North Africa and Sicily, the largest training was focused on the bombing that he had never had during the war. The aerial bombardment of German cities would, perhaps, was, however, nothing compared to what surely would have suffered by Anglo American. " After a silence of the onlookers, Gen. James Carbone tried to speak again, but His Majesty the King stopped him with a peremptory gesture, stood up, the Council was dissolved. They left all but the head of government. The King decided quickly, was also released after a few minutes Marshal Pietro Badoglio, and declared: 'The King decided that the truce is declared in accordance with the agreements. " Churches, therefore, to Gen. Vittorio Ambrosio from where he could send the announcement to the nation and because it had not been installed at the Quirinal no installation for radio, as it should be installed to clear directives given to Gen. Carboni, went to EIAR headquarters in Via Asiago. The context in which the Privy Council was held on September 8, 1943, and operating decisions require that followed, so he had to speak Marshal Pietro Badoglio, a few days after landing in Brindisi, Apulia, speaking of Lemon " I blame you for being late to conclude an armistice. What this unjust, it is evident that it was necessary to reach a conclusion before the other party to endorse it: until September 3 and we did not have the consent ally. A simple declaration of surrender, humiliating, or only by us, we would deliver full power to the Germans without any hope of help from the Anglo-Americans are still far from Rome [...] declared the armistice, the division now Germanic stationed near the capital moved against the city, and for reasons that will be cleared in due course, after a few episodes of heroic resistance, the defense collapsed. It was no longer possible to stay in Rome without falling into the hands of the Germans (Ie, without leaving Italy without a legitimate government), so, all the royal family, me, and I have told ministers that, we went to Brindisi, via Tivoli and Pescara. " His Majesty the King Vittorio Emanuele III, describes the context and the decisions he made on the basis that the Privy Council, "the evening of 8 September the German divisions that were near the capital, moved to Rome. If the launch of the Allied paratroopers around the city had taken place, or if the landing at Anzio had occurred on September 8, neither the government nor the King and royal family, would have moved from Rome. Instead, remain prisoners in the capital, meant to leave Italy without the head of state and the legitimate government, or only with an illegitimate government at the mercy of the Germans. [...] Nothing glorious, some have said? But it seems that the glory of a king should know when to stop when the interest of the country requires him to operate freely and with benefit to the nation. Staying in Rome would make the end of Regent Horthy that the Germans forced to say on the radio the opposite of what spontaneously expressed a few days before. If in 1940 the British had stayed in Dunkirk for all die on the spot, they would have written a glorious page more clearly, but useless, or very little profit, while the soldiers served much better later, when the British army, reconstituted, went on the offensive. So, do not escape or refuge abroad, for me, what would have been leaving the country. If I went with the government in Brindisi, that is a part of the free soil of the nation, was to create a legitimate government freely, to rebuild an army, as happened once, lest the soldiers of the Italian divisions left in the South were considered prisoners of war. The co-belligerency, obtained by my government, saved a lot of things, including the personal interests of many anti-monarchist, especially the last hour, with their hateful are not returned at that time in Italy without the co-belligerency " . So the King and the Government have decided differently if, on 8 September 1943, the operation had taken place TWO GIANT, who did not take place because, before the King was informed of any thing and call the Privy Council , Gen. James Carboni s'assunse moral responsibility, to impose military and political allies to abandon the operation already programmed. From the tone of the statements of Gen. James Carboni in the Privy Council is clear, also, as the latter's initiative was inspired by the attempt to bring the Sovereign and the government in a position to denounce the armistice signed soon with the alliance and force Third Empire German debellatio until all of the Axis powers in the context of a political choice definitely filogermanica. The King on the intervention of a simple majority Luigi Marchesi, however, worked quite the opposite choice and having the courage to implement the decisions certainly serious, the consequences, but that proved to be the only ones able to save the international personality of the State Italian Risorgimento, the first born, and to lay the institutional foundations, and military policies of the War of Liberation, according to Renaissance of a nation. And the choices were free provinces of the south, instead of Sardinia, as first planned, to be closer to the front, and Italians of the occupied provinces, just as in other circumstances, the soldier king decided to resist the line of the Piave, rather than retreat to the Po, as even then the allies would have preferred.

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